Abstract. Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that they might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness, and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life, and indeed that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.
The Vegetative State
In recent decades, modern medical technology and resuscitation techniques have increased the number and prevalence of neurological syndromes involving severe cognitive and motor disabilities, of which the vegetative state (VS), first defined in 1972, is a prime example. VS refers to a post-comatose state secondary to profound brain damage, typically due to hypoxia or traumatic brain injury. Patients in this state recover to the extent that they usually do not require respiratory support. However, although they appear to be awake-they typically open their eyes and have discernible sleep-wake cycles-they fail to provide any evidence of awareness of self or environment. Such patients may respond to painful stimuli with reflex flexion but show no voluntary response to external stimuli. Such patients appear to be in a form of "eyes-opened unconsciousness" where there is a disassociation between wakefulness and awareness. 1 The diagnosis of VS is based upon repeated failed attempts to elicit voluntary responses from a patient. VS patients should be distinguished from patients in the minimally conscious state (MCS) where brain damaged patients do manifest some intermittent or minor responses to stimuli such as visual tracking, or responding to questions with a gesture or word. 2 The distinction between VS and MCS is prognostically important. Patients who are in VS for more than 6 months after sustaining brain injury have only a very small chance of significant recovery. 3 Prognosis for patients in MCS is more variable. 
Brain imaging evidence for consciousness?
VS is diagnosed when there is no evidence of consciousness. But as science advances, new ways of detecting consciousness are emerging. Recent neuroimaging research in VS patients has provided evidence that some patients previously diagnosed as in VS might in fact possess some measure of consciousness despite the absence of any observable behavioural evidence.
A number of brain imaging studies in VS patients have already shown that areas of the brain increase their metabolic activity in response to sensory stimuli-for example the auditory processing areas of such patients might be activated in response to hearing a familiar voice say their name. 5 The findings of a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Owen and his colleagues are even more striking. 6 This study focused on a 23-year-old woman who sustained a severe brain injury in a traffic accident.
After an initial comatose state, this patient opened her eyes and demonstrated sleep-wake cycles. However, even during the waking periods, she was unresponsive to stimuli and did not manifest spontaneous intentional behaviour, signs considered diagnostic of a vegetative state.
In one of their experiments, the authors tried to engage the patient in two mental imagery tasks by asking her either to "imagine visiting the rooms in your home" or to "imagine playing tennis." Patterns of brain activation observed using fMRI during each task were highly suggestive of an active mental performance relevant to the task: the observed brain activation patterns were the classic neural correlates of these two mental imagery tasks, and statistical parametric maps of brain activation were indistinguishable from those recorded from a group of conscious control subjects.
What is established by these findings? The authors of the study are quite categorical: they claim that this pattern of response "confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings." 7 They consequently argue that their work raises the serious possibility that other brain damaged patients have been wrongly diagnosed as being in the VS.
If these claims are correct, then these findings have far reaching implications.
Some of the most heated moral disputes of our time have revolved around legal right to forthcoming fMRI research will have a major impact on future moral and legal disputes about withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from brain-damaged patients. These findings will be cited as evidence for uncertainty in assessments of whether or not patients who appear to be unconscious are truly unconscious, and it seems likely that fMRI will increasingly be called upon to provide definitive evidence of the absence or presence of consciousness in disputed cases. an account of why and how consciousness matters. matters is having our desires satisfied. According to objective good theories, certain activities are intrinsically good-for example, developing deep personal relationships and talents, gaining knowledge, and so on. In this paper we needn't decide between these three theories. And it is plausible that all three capture important aspects of well-being.
The Moral Significance of Consciousness
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This view is implicit in Plato's remarks on well-being in the Philebus, where he suggests that the good life for a man could neither consist only in pleasure nor only in wisdom.
Socrates first rejects a life of pure pleasure:
…without true judgement you could not judge at the moment of enjoyment that you are experiencing it, while without the power of calculation you could not even calculate that you will get enjoyment in the future; your life would be that not of a man, but of a sea-lung or one of those marine creatures whose bodies are confined by a shell.
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and then a life of pure wisdom:
The question is now whether any of us would be content with a life in which he possessed thought, intelligence, knowledge and perfect memory for everything, but had no sense of pleasure, great or small, nor of pain either, a state of perfect intelligence to all such feelings.
21
The good life, Plato concludes, consists in an appropriate 'mix' of pleasure and wisdom.
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We'll therefore just keep all three theories on board and draw their implications to our questions as we go along. We'll accordingly distinguish between an entity's experiential, desiderative and objective interests.
So let us consider what moral significance consciousness would have in light of
each of these theories. Consider first objective theories. The typical goods listed by objective theorists-for example, deep personal relationships, knowledge, achievement, development of talents-clearly require a high degree of sapience but they do not obviously require phenomenal consciousness. 23 The same is true of desiderative interests.
Although some desires have a phenomenological aspect-think of how it feels to crave something-it needn't feel like anything to want something. And on desire-satisfaction theories, our interests are promoted not when we feel psychological satisfaction but when our desires are satisfied in a logical sense-when we desire that p and p is actually the case.
It might seem that at least pleasure and pain are good or bad only because of their phenomenal character-because of what it intrinsically feels like to have hedonic experiences. Even this, however, might be too quick. 'Pain' can refer to a certain kind of bodily sensation, or to the felt state of disliking a sensation. But 'pain' can also refer to bodily damage, or to the representation of bodily damage in the brain or to strong motivation elicited by such a representation. 24 These latter states can take place without phenomenal consciousness. Would such states still count as suffering and call for relief?
Many will plausibly deny that this makes sense, and we agree. We shall assume that pain in the sense that matters requires phenomenality-that for a representation of bodily damage or a motivation to get rid of it to morally matter, there must be something it's like to be in that state. 25 But even this claim is by no means universally accepted. 26 In any case, unless hedonism is correct, the conceptual tie between phenomenal consciousness and hedonic states only establishes that consciousness is a necessary condition for experiential interests. It leaves it open that beings that do not enjoy phenomenality might still possess non-experiential interests.
So far we've tried to explore the ways in which particular types of interests might presuppose consciousness. This did not take us very far. But perhaps there is a more direct connection between interests and consciousness. Here is one suggestion. When interests are promoted or set back, these are not just ways in which things in the world might go impersonally better or worse. It's someone's good that is being promoted or set back. It may be impersonally good to prevent a great work of art from being needlessly destroyed, but we promote interests for someone's sake. 27 What is the difference between these two forms of value? How is it that certain states of affairs matter, not impersonally, but in relation to someone? The difference seems to be that a painting is just an object but a squirrel or infant or adult human all have a points of view, a subjective take on things.
In this way, possession of consciousness-of a subjective standpoint-might be a general condition for an entity's having interests. It's hard to give a substantive argument to support this suggestion, but think of how awry it seems to say 'He led a good life-but there was absolutely nothing it was like to live that life' (a thought echoed, perhaps, in
Plato's rejection of pleasureless wisdom).
We've tried to sketch an account of SC and what might ground it. Notice, however, that we have only considered the claim that consciousness is a necessary condition for the existence of interests. It is a further claim that it is a sufficient condition.
After all, as we have pointed out, consciousness might still be present when cognition and motivation are entirely absent or present only in minimal form. Indeed, it is doubtful that a mental life consisting only of a bare stream of consciousness-a sequence of random and hedonically-neutral sensations-could be said to involve interests of any kind. A being can't have desires, and thus desiderative interests, without a sufficient degree of cognitive capacity. Nor can one possess objective interests such as the interest in friendship or knowledge in the absence of such capacities (indeed many objective goods seem to require self-consciousness, not phenomenal consciousness). What about experiential interests? One cannot enjoy or suffer without being phenomenally conscious, but it's far from obvious that mere possession of phenomenal consciousness implies that one has the capacity to experience pain or pleasure. A being that lacked both cognitive capacities and the capacity to feel pleasure and pain might be a being without interests despite possessing phenomenal consciousness. On the other hand, the capacity to experience hedonic states seems to require little or no sapience. Imagine that bits of brain are artificially assembled to form only that part of the brain needed to sustain physical pain, and that a single moment of pure agony is then generated in this brain part before it is again disassembled. In this example, we cannot really talk of a person or even animal that is suffering the pain. Yet it still seems that this moment of pain is bad-not impersonally bad but bad for someone, even if that someone is only a transient and rudimentary subject of consciousness.
There is another important point to make about the scope of SC. Even if phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for interests, we should not simply assume that the fact that an entity has irretrievably lost the capacity for phenomenal consciousness immediately implies that it no longer has any interests. This implication does go through for experiential interests, but it is not as obvious with respect to desiderative and objective interests.
In order to have a point of view on things, it might be enough if one were conscious at some point in time. But once this condition is met, it might be that some interests extend beyond the extinction of consciousness. Take desiderative interests. A person's desire that p could be satisfied even when he no longer exists, pari passu if he exists without consciousness. And some objective interests may have an equally tenuous tie to the presence of consciousness. Now we do not want to enter here into the dispute over whether people can benefit or be harmed even after they have died. It suffices to note that there are those who hold this view. Presumably, the case for interests extending only beyond the loss of the capacity for consciousness would be stronger. We do not want to endorse this claim, merely to note that acceptance of SC needn't directly imply that beings no longer have (non-experiential) interests when consciousness is irreparably extinguished.
Consciousness, Sapience and the Value of Life
We've accepted that consciousness makes a moral difference, and that it makes this 
I. Neither consciousness nor sapience
This is the condition VS patients are assumed to be in: a condition where the brain still maintains the body's vegetative functions but a mental life is totally absent. There is nothing it is like to be in this condition, nor is there any real degree of what we called sapience; someone in this condition can't be said to believe or want anything. Note, however, that being even in this condition is compatible with the occurrence of fairly sophisticated information-processing in some areas of the brain-such as the processing of visual or semantic information observed in some neuroimaging studies of VS patients.
Importantly, such mental activity would not only be non-conscious-that is, taking place in the absence of phenomenal consciousness-but also sub-personal-too localized and disjointed to merit ascription of mental states to the person as opposed to ascription of information-processing to localized sub-systems in her brain.
The mere occurrence of complex information processing does not endow a being with any kind of moral status-otherwise it would be morally wrong to switch off a computer. Might there still be some value in the preservation of such sub-personal cognitive and affective processes, not in their own right, but because they are the remnants of the mental life of a person? (Think of such sub-personal responses to hearing one's name or the name of one's beloved.) To us it seems highly doubtful that there is any moral reason to sustain a life just in order to allow such sub-personal processes to continue to occur.
Since a person in this condition has no phenomenal consciousness, she can feel no pain or pleasure-she has no experiential interests. Notice that some of the sub-personal correlates of pain and pleasure might still occur in her brain in response to stimuli but, as we've remarked earlier, it's hard to think of unfelt pain as amounting to any kind of genuine suffering-to anything bad for the person. And, in the absence of sapience, she can have no desires. So she also lacks any present desiderative interests.
On some views of well-being, however, she might still have some desiderative and objective interests grounded in her past conscious and sapient life. In particular, there is the possibility of desiderative and objective interests that have to do with her continuing to exist in such a vegetative state. However, if there are such interests, they are likely to point in the direction of discontinuing life-sustaining treatment. Take first desiderative interests. Several surveys reveal that a vast majority of people would prefer not to be given life-sustaining treatment if they were in a non-reversible vegetative state. 28 And these preferences might themselves reflect recognition of an objective interest in not continuing to exist in a state that has no personal meaning and that could be seen as degrading to one's dignity as a rational being. Furthermore, to the extent that persons in such a condition might still be said to have interests, these interests (both desiderative and objective) are likely to include the interests of close others, interests that in many (though not all) cases will support ending the patient's life.
We need not take a stand on whether interests can persist beyond the extinction of consciousness (or death); in their absence there may not be positive reasons, grounded in the patient's interests, to end her life, but nor would there be such reasons to sustain it.
And even those who baulk at thinking of persons' interests extending beyond the loss of consciousness might accept that these past desires and objective considerations generate moral reasons to end a person's life, reasons we have out of respect for that person.
II. Significant sapience without consciousness
If VS is understood to imply the absence of phenomenal consciousness, then the possibility that significant sapience will persist in the absence of consciousness is, strictly speaking, compatible with VS. Nevertheless, so far as we know it has not yet been discussed. This is not entirely surprising: the possibility that sapience might come apart from phenomenal consciousness is controversial, and there are difficult questions about what would justify ascribing sapience without consciousness, indeed, even about the very coherence of this possibility. Still, it is a possibility that cannot be just ruled out, and neuroscience has already provided us with many examples of aspects of the mental which, despite seeming inextricably intertwined in normal subjects, can nevertheless come apart in certain forms of brain damage.
Let us try to be clear about what significant sapience without consciousness would amount to. It would involve the presence of cognitive and motivational processes that are sufficiently extensive and systematic to merit not just ascription of local information processing in some area of the brain but ascription of genuine person-level mental states such as beliefs and desires. But this mental activity would take place without phenomenality-strictly speaking, there would be nothing it is like to be such a person. Now this possibility is obviously a conceptual relative of the possibility of zombies, but it is not as far fetched as that philosophers' thought experiment. A zombie is supposed to be physically identical to a person yet lack any phenomenal consciousness.
The possibility we are considering requires no such thing. It only requires that it be possible that the neural machinery required for phenomenal consciousness would be damaged while the brain areas responsible for cognition and motivation remain largely intact. This possibility may ultimately prove to be incoherent but at this stage of knowledge we certainly can't just rule it out. Indeed notice that when Owen et al write of their patients that "her decision to cooperate with us by imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represented a clear act of intention that confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings," the evidence they are citing is really evidence for sapience (indeed, for access consciousness), and only indirectly, if at all, evidence for phenomenal consciousness.
What would be the moral status of a patient in such a state? This is a difficult and largely unexplored question in ethics, considered until now largely in discussion of artificial intelligence. Some views of moral status or interests do explicitly require the capacity for consciousness but do not clearly identify the relevant notion of consciousness as that of phenomenal consciousness. Others ground them only in possession of certain cognitive or desiderative states, and can therefore be interpreted as accounts of moral status or interests that require only possession of sapience. However, given that the authors defending these views do not explicitly consider the possibility of sapience without phenomenal consciousness, we doubt that such a reading is warranted.
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We only have space to make some tentative suggestions. Given the absence of phenomenal consciousness, we believe that such a person would not have experiential interests-she might have states that are functionally very similar to pleasure and pain, but there would be nothing it feels like to be in those states. We do not think that such states would count as intrinsically good or bad but, as noted earlier, not everyone agrees. 30 A patient in such a state would have genuine desires and preferences. Would these generate desiderative interests? The answer to this question depends on whether, as we've suggested, phenomenal consciousness is required if a person is to have a point of view, that is for the satisfaction of some desire to be a benefit for someone. It might even be thought that the desires and preferences of someone in this condition should be taken into account out of respect for that person, whether or not they generate genuine interests-indeed it might be that phenomenal consciousness is not required for personhood and the moral standing it implies. These are all questions that require further exploration.
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What, finally, about desiderative interests that might be generated by past desires?
To a large extent the situation here is no different than that presented by the absence of both consciousness and sapience. There is however a minor complication. In the surveys we cited earlier, people were envisaging being in a vegetative state with neither consciousness and sapience. Would they have different wishes if they expected sapience to be preserved? We think that this is unlikely, but this is a matter for empirical inquiry. These remarks can be understood simply as a preference-as a desiderative interest that may or may not be shared with others. It is an empirical question how widespread this preference is. Understood as a response to an objective interest, the idea seems to be that remaining conscious, and thus in one sense continuing to exist as a psychological entity, yet losing all of the aspects of sapience that constituted you as a person with particular projects and attachments, is more meaningless and degrading than to lose consciousness completely and thus stop existing as a psychological entity-recall Plato's dismissive remarks about the lives of 'marine creatures'. However, if this preference is really grounded in the fear that one's experiential interests would be compromised-that one would go on suffering pain-then this preference would not be reasonable if we were able to reliably detect and alleviate pain in MCS patients. As noted above, it might even be possible to promote the experiential interests of such patients by inducing pleasant sensations.
III. Consciousness with minimal or no sapience
Indeed, to the extent that there are genuine desiderative and objective interests in not continuing to exist in the MCS, these might conflict with the experiential benefits to the patient from continued existence, to the extent that we can ensure that she suffers little pain and that she enjoys sensory pleasures. However as we noted above, it is not clear that such possible benefits in themselves generate a strong interest in continuing to exist, and given the absence of any psychological continuity or even connectedness with her past, sapient self, these many not, in any case, be benefits that genuinely accrue to her, a temporally-extended psychological entity that may no longer exist.
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In the final month of her life, the parents of Terry Schiavo insisted that she was in MCS, not VS. But we've argued that the discovery of consciousness in patients diagnosed as in VS hardly settles the ethical questions on the side of continuing lifesustaining treatment. If the patient is in the MCS, it might rather be that we have no or only weak reasons to sustain her life, and some further positive reasons not to sustain it.
IV. Consciousness accompanied by normal or significant sapience
A patient in this state, externally indistinguishable from a VS patient, would be in an extreme and absolute form of the Locked-In State. 42 Such a person recovers both consciousness and sapience. His rationality and memory are essentially preserved. He wakes up to find that, while perhaps still capable of a measure of perceptual input, he is utterly incapable of any kind of motor output. His ability to act in the external world, let alone communicate with others, has been lost. And unlike other locked-in patients, he is not even capable of eye movement and blinking which offer at least a minimal form of contact with (and influence on) the external world.
Like the patient in the MCS, a locked-in patient enjoys phenomenal consciousness and thus has experiential interests. He can feel great pain and, potentially, can enjoy pleasure. But unlike the MCS patient he has retained his intellectual faculties and the core of his self. And it might be thought that we are at least morally required to do our best to preserve the life of a patient in this state. This, however, is also far from clear. The issue revolves around whether such a life is really worth living.
It is arguable that such a life is even less worth living than that in the MCS. A patient's ongoing interests in the MCS are essentially experiential. We can address these by trying to minimize physical pain and, perhaps, by trying to induce pleasure.
Considered in itself there is nothing especially bad about such an existence even if, controversially, it could be said to go against the desiderative or objective interests of the temporally-extended person of which the MCS patient is a continuant. Things are very different in the case of the totally locked-in patient. Being aware of his condition and with little hope of communication with others, the patient cannot pursue most of his desires and personal projects and is cut off from most of the objective goods that make for a meaningful human life. Not only is he incapable of virtually all forms of agency, or of any meaningful social relations with others, he is also painfully aware that this is the case, meaning that his objective, desiderative and experiential interests are all frustrated.
Is this a life worth living? A less than completely locked-in patient recently described his experience:
Words can't describe the situation I have been left in… but this is as close as I can get: an extremely horrific experience that I wouldn't wish on my worst enemy. The incredibly immense frustration levels at times have eased slightly over the years because of physical and health gains I have made. If dying is as painless and peaceful as just drifting off to sleep, then there's plenty of really very frustrating times that at a particular point I wished I wasn't here any more… An itch is completely unbearable and incredibly frustrating because I can't scratch it… I thought of suicide often… I never had enough courage then to go through with it. Even if I wanted to do it now I couldn't, it's physically Bernat 2002, p. 298. 33 It is controversial what, if anything, counts as objective third-person evidence for the presence of phenomenal consciousness. We do assume that others do enjoy phenomenal consciousness and therefore that the everyday behaviour of normal humans is adequate evidence both of sapience (or 'access consciousness') and of phenomenal consciousness.
34 This is but an assumption. Strictly speaking, it's at least possible that some patients diagnosed with MCS do not really have phenomenal consciousness-that they have only minimal sapience.
35 Sapience clearly is a matter of degree, in both dispositional and occurrent senses. First, an organism can possess cognitive and conceptual capacities to various degrees and, consequently, enjoy different levels of awareness of self and environment. Second, an organism ability to actually exercise these capacities can vary over time: the sapience of an extremely tired person at the moment before falling asleep is impaired in obvious ways. Sapience in the MCS seems to be severely impaired in the second and, probably, also the first sense. 36 We are assuming that our imagined MCS patient has little or no prospects of recovery.
Neuroscientists have recently used deep brain stimulation to induce modest improvement in an MCS patient (Schiff 2007) , but this line of research is still in its infancy. 42 Worryingly, the current authoritative medical definition of VS (Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 1994) defines this state in purely behavioural term. This has the absurd implication that even if we had conclusive evidence that a patient is totally locked-in, she might still count as VS on this definition-unless we understand 'behaviour' to include purely mental acts.
43 Chisholm and Gillett 2005. 44 One doctor reports "In my 25 years in medicine, I've probably communicated with four or five patients who were locked in, spending many hours over many days with them to determine their wishes. None of these patients wanted to stay alive in that condition once they comprehended that they were going to be locked in." (Fine 2005 ) 45 Laureys et al 2005. 46 Bauby 1998. 47 Would there be even a point to trying? There might be rare exceptions. In J. L. Borges's fiction 'The Secret Miracle', a playwright facing a firing squad finds that time has miraculously stopped, allowing him to complete his life's work in his head (Borges 2000) 48 In some locked-in patients, the brain damage might have impaired the capacity to experience bodily sensation, and on some theories of affect this may lead to a blunting of affect, potentially reducing such patients' capacity to feel distress. 
